terör

• terör kavramı yaygın olarak "devleti kimi politikalarını değiştirmeye zorlama adına girişilen şiddet içerikli eylem" olarak tanımlanır. bu yaygın tanımın ötesine geçerek terör kavramını daha kapsamlı idrak etme ve komşu kavramlardan ayrıştırabilme adına, christian joppke'ye ait olan aşağıdaki paragrafları incelenebilir.
  
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  ‘terror’ is a notoriously elusive concept. charles tilly sought to identify it not as a stable ‘disposition’ by a specic type of actor, but fungible ‘strategy’ deployable by many agents for multiple purposes. in his ‘relational’ optic, terror is the ‘asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime’ (tilly 2004, 5). from this follows that it is implausible to limit the ambit of terror to ‘subnational groups or clandestine agents,’ as does the us state department in its official definition, and which only seems to follow its colloquial usage today (quoted ibid., 7). note in this context that ‘terror’ had entered the political lexicon as terreur, the ‘reign of terror’ of the freshly minted republican french state against their real or perceived domestic (and notoriously including fellow-revolutionary) enemies in 1793–1794. in the twentieth century, terror’s statist legacy was prolonged by stalin and hitler and their ‘totalitarian’ regimes that, in hannah arendt’s famous terms, had instigated a ‘novel form of government’ based on ‘ideology and terror’ (1948, chap. 13). in sum, the term ‘sprawls across a wide range of human cruelties’ (tilly 2004, 9), and ‘no coherent set of cause-effect propositions can explain terrorism as a whole’ (ibid., 11).
  
  alas, tilly’s strategic-realpolitisch broadening of the concept of terror (in which states gure as potentially the biggest criminals), decoupling it from actors’ intentions, makes it also a vague and unspecific concept. it is more plausible to identify terror by what may make it ‘morally distinctive’ (scheffler 2006), which necessarily includes actors’ intentions. in this mold, samuel scheffler identifies terror as the use of violence against random noncombatants or civilians, with the intention (a dispositional concept!) to ‘create fear in others’ (6). indeed, ‘fear’ is the currency of terror, as already hannah arendt had seen in her depiction of terror-based ‘totalitarianism’ (1948, chap. 13). at least since thomas hobbes, ‘fear’ is known as organized society’s most vicious enemy, and in hobbes’ scenario it is precisely what compels people to move from the state of nature into the civic condition. the terrorist’s project of spreading fear, on the contrary, is to ‘destabilize or degrade an existing social order’ (scheffler 2006, 6).
  
  from this follows that terror is not like ordinary crime, to be sanctioned under ordinary penal law. the german penal law scholar jakobs (2004) controversially distinguished between ‘citizen penal law’ (bu¨rgerstrafrecht) and ‘enemy penal law’ (feindstrafrecht). this distinction was interestingly known to hobbes and kant. the ordinary criminal, argues jakobs, is caught in a ‘self-contradiction,’ as he breaks the legal order but also claims it for himself when not just breaking it. his act is at best ‘irritation,’ a ‘reparable mishap’ (91). the criminal can be reintegrated, and is ‘charged as citizen to redress the damage inflicted on the existing norms’ (ibid.). in fact, when the traditional practice of punishing crime through banishment was replaced by the modern practice of punishing through imprisonment, the underlying rationale was the new idea of the state as ‘moral educator,’ and the ‘faith that humans can be reformed’ (kingston 2005, 29). in the optic of jakobs (2004), the idea of reintegration is questionable for the terrorist. this is because he ‘denies the legitimacy of the legal order in principle, and his project is to destroy this order’ (92). accordingly, the terrorist figures for the state not as ‘person’ but as ‘source of threat’ (gefahrenquelle). he is not even punished for his past acts, which would recognize him as ‘person.’ instead, he is to be neutralized for the future, subject not to principled strafe (punishment) but utilitarian massregel (measure). the terrorist, in jakobs’ brachial account, is not a person but a kind of thing. this is not merely a provocation, but practiced already. an example is the german legal institute of sicherungsverwahrung, which allows incarcerating suspected terrorists and other risky categories of people – like drug dealers – not for proved past crimes but for possible future crimes.
  
  but perhaps the ‘citizen o ender’ vs. ‘enemy’ dyad, as proposed by jakobs (2004), is still too anodyne to capture the utter evil that is terror. this is because soldiers are ‘enemies’ too, but surely they would not (normally) be considered terrorists. soldiers are bound by the law of war, they only act upon a formal declaration of war, and they are publically recognizable by their uniforms. prisoners of war are not ‘out of bounds’ but to be treated according to international protocol, which protects their humanity. terrorists, by contrast, are neither ‘offenders’ nor ‘enemy soldiers’; they are ‘outlaws,’ vogelfrei in early modern german law parlance (duff 2008). one might liken terrorists to pirates. blackstone had described the pirate in the late eighteenth century as hostis humani generis: ‘as he has renounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him’ (blackstone, quoted in duff 2008, 11). accordingly, the terrorist is not just ‘paradigmatic noncitizen,’ as dubber (2010, 196) summarizes the position of penal law theorist gu¨nther jakobs; instead, he is ‘outside all human normative communities’ (duff 2008, 11). in contemporary american diction, the terrorist is ‘unlawful enemy combatant.’
  
  these are rather extreme conclusions to draw. the minimum to say is that terror differs from ordinary crime in its public dimension. crime is ‘private’ while terror is ‘public’ with respect to the ends pursued, only terror seeking ends that are ‘binding for the wider community’ (see offe 1985, 827). on the opposite, criminals don’t question the common legal order, they only want an exemption, or – like the mafia – count on its ineffectiveness. walter laqueur thus distinguishes between ‘political terrorism’ and ‘international crime syndicates’: ‘mafias have no interest in overthrowing the government and decisively weakening society; in fact, they have a vested interest in a prosperous economy’ (1996, 25). terrorists, by contrast, posit themselves outside this order, even want to destroy it, so that reintegration – the usual rationale of the penal process – is not the obvious state response. macklin (2014a) finds that ‘banishment’ [meaning, citizenship revocation - sk] for terrorists is ‘both superfluous and anachronistic’ because states now have criminal justice systems to ‘rehabilitate and reintegrate wrongdoers within the state.’ this seems to overlook the nature of terror, if compared with ordinary crime. it is also paternalistic as ‘reintegration’ is precisely what the terrorist defies and, in turn, should not be owed by the society attacked.
  
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  kaynak: christian joppke. 2016. "terror and the loss of citizenship." citizenship studies 20(6-7): 728-748. (doi: 10.1080/13621025.2016.1191435)
  
  tema:
  (bkz: siyaset bilimi /@derinsular)